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BABY, BYE, BYE, BYE: HOW THE UNITED STATES, ITALY, & 
FRANCE USE TRADEMARK ANTI-COUNTERFEITING MECHANISMS 
TO COMBAT THE PROLIFERATION OF FAKE GOODS IN CHINA 
 
J. Francesca Gross† 
 
Abstract 
Christian Louboutin. Manchester United. Agent Provocateur. In a 
world where trademarks have become more than brand identifiers, 
counterfeit versions of brands should be easily identifiable. Yet 
counterfeiting regimes from Asian countries continue to funnel 
counterfeit goods through the United States and European Union 
borders. Both regions continue to impose stricter anti-counterfeiting 
laws and regulations. Nevertheless, companies in the United States, 
Italy, and France are drastically affected by counterfeiting, losing 
billions per year in revenue. The International Chamber of 
Commerce’s (“ICC”) Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and 
Piracy (“BASCAP”) and the International Trademark Association 
(“INTA”) estimate that the value of international and domestic trade 
in counterfeit and pirated goods in 2013 ranged from $710–$917 
billion. BASCAP and INTA predict that by 2022, the value of business 
in counterfeit and pirated goods could reach $991 billion. 
Asian countries produce more than 70% of all counterfeit goods 
with the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”) and Hong Kong as the 
leading provenance economies for counterfeiting. China’s 
proliferation of counterfeit goods stems from economic, social, and 
political forces that influence China’s socialist market economy. On 
average, 20% of consumer products in the Chinese market are 
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various countries including the United States, Italy, and France, 
costing corporations billions in revenue and placing consumers in 
significant financial and health risk. The substantial impact of 
counterfeiting on the global economy has spurred the United States, 
Italy, and France to impose strict anti-counterfeiting laws and 
regulations. The United States anti-counterfeiting arsenal to protect 
trademark owners includes civil enforcement under the Lanham Act 
15 U.S.C. § 1051 and criminal enforcement under 18 U.S.C. § 2320. 
Italy and France impose similar laws and regulations but also take 
their anti-counterfeiting mechanism further by seeking stricter 
criminal penalties for manufacturers, distributors, and consumers. 
This Article explains the regulatory and legal anti-counterfeiting 
mechanisms adopted by the United States and the European Union, 
specifically Italy and France, to illustrate the international legal and 
regulatory tools used to reduce the economic hardships of 
counterfeiting. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Trademarks continue to possess significant value in our lives. 
Despite the high influx of trademark counterfeiting, trademarks have 
become more than just brand identifiers. Trademarks are a method of 
communicating status, wealth, education, and interest as well as a 
source of employment in a capitalistic society. In the United States, 
trademark-intensive companies are on the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office’s (“USPTO”) top fifty registered companies list for 
those domestically or internationally registered and randomly selected 
for the study.1 Trademark-intensive companies directly account for 
roughly 23.7 million jobs and 85% of all IP-intensive employment.2 
In the EU, trademark-intensive industries account for 65.4 million 
direct or indirect jobs or roughly 30.3% of all employment.3 
Trademark-intensive sectors account for 35.9% of the EU’s global 
domestic product.4 
Counterfeiting continues to see growth as a multi-billion-dollar, 
global industry that flourishes and causes economic harm to trademark 
owners, consumers, and company beneficiaries. According to the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and the European Union Intellectual Property Office’s (EUIPO) 2016 
Report on the Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy 
(“OECD/EUIPO Report”), trade in counterfeit and pirated goods 
accounted for as much as 2.5% of the value of international trade, or 
$461 billion, in 2013.5 Notably, this figure represents an increase of 
 
 1. See U.S. PAT. AND TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
UNITED STATES ECONOMY: 2016 UPDATE 8 (2016), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/IPandtheUSEconomySept201
6.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9W7-3P65]. 
 2. Id. at 10.  
 3. Intellectual Property Rights Intensive Industries and Economic Performance 
in the European Union, at 8, EUIPO (Oct. 2016), https://euipo.europa.eu/tunnel-
web/secure/webdav/guest/document_library/observatory/documents/IPContributio
nStudy/performance_in_the_European_Union/performance_in_the_European_Uni
on_full.pdf [https://perma.cc/C46H-G7HF].  
 4. Id.  
 5. Trade in Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Mapping the Economic Impact, 
OECD/EUIPO, at 11 (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264252653-en 
[https://perma.cc/KDB3-N3U2] (hereinafter “OECD/EUIPO Trade in Counterfeit 
Report”). 
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more than 80% of the findings in the OECD’s 2008.6 In 2013, 
domestic and international trade in counterfeit and pirated goods 
reached between $710–$917 billion.7 The most significant number of 
seized counterfeit merchandise hails from the PRC and Hong Kong.  
As counterfeiting has evolved to become a more sophisticated 
venture, countries are rallying together to combat the exponentially 
growing threat to international trade. The International 
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition Inc. (“IACC”) is a District of Columbia 
nonprofit organization devoted solely to combating counterfeiting and 
piracy. Formed in 1979 with a handful of companies seeking 
intellectual property protection, the IACC has grown to a membership 
base of over 250 companies from more than forty countries 
worldwide. IACC’s membership includes a cross-section of 
businesses and industries, including companies from automotive, 
apparel, luxury goods, pharmaceuticals, food, software, and 
entertainment.8 
IACC works to combat counterfeiting, a threat that is the result of 
criminal enterprises in Asia, centralized to China’s southern 
provinces.9 In 2013, counterfeiting and piracy in Asia accounted for 
$310 billion.10 China continues to account for the largest share of the 
global counterfeiting total at $143 billion, or 46%.11 Cities like 
Guangdong, China, produce most of the counterfeit goods funneled 
into the United States and the European Union, particularly Italy and 
France.12 China’s proliferation of counterfeit goods stems from 
societal and economic issues within the country, including local 
governments aiding the creation of distribution channels needed for 
 
 6. Id. 
 7. Frontier Economics, The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy, 
INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.iccwbo.be/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/ICC-BASCAP-INTA-2016-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RZA-8JEF].  
 8. History & Mission, INT’L ANTI-COUNTERFEITING COAL. INC., 
https://www.iacc.org/about/history-mission [https://perma.cc/A6KZ-VYVU].  
 9. See Tina Cassidy, Bagging the Knockoffs: There’s Nothing Like the Real 
Thing, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 26, 2002) (noting Nancy Kratzer, Assistant Director 
for Fraud Investigations, United States Customs, and Director of the National 
Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center statement). 
 10. Frontier Economics, The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy, 
INT’L CHAMBER OF COM., (Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.iccwbo.be/wp-
content/uploads/2017/02/ICC-BASCAP-INTA-2016-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9RZA-8JEF]. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Andrew Yeh, The Complex Trade in Luxury Fakes, FIN. TIMES OF ASIA 
(London), Apr. 19, 2006, at 10. 
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the manufacturing and distribution of counterfeit goods, local 
protectionism, and economic trade of counterfeit goods supporting 
local economies.13 Hong Kong’s growth and salience as a transport 
point for counterfeiters increases as transport points are misused and 
as small parcels of counterfeit cargo go unnoticed and unseized.14  
Due to the increase in counterfeiting, law enforcement agencies 
increased their raids of counterfeiting shops where police found labels 
and patches bearing the counterfeit trademarks already affixed.15 
Additionally, members of the counterfeiting syndicates have attached 
labels and patches bearing counterfeit trademarks to previously non-
branded items once the merchandise passes through customs in the 
respective countries.16 The United States, Italy, and France 
implemented stricter laws to combat the growing number of 
counterfeit goods entering their borders and restrict counterfeit 
syndicates’ cross border trade of goods.  
This Comment formulaically analyzes the dilemma of trademark 
counterfeiting while outlining the United States’ and European 
Union’s legal and regulatory arsenals and proposing potential 
solutions to this problem, which affects large and small corporations 
globally. Part I discusses the proliferation of trademark counterfeiting 
regimes in the PRC and Hong Kong while explaining the economic 
and societal effects counterfeiting has on the world. Part II outlines the 
United States’ laws and regulations to reduce trademark 
counterfeiting. Part III provides a brief overview of the European 
Union’s efforts to combat counterfeiting and lays the foundation for 
the legal and regulatory framework that Italy and France utilize, while 
imposing stricter, countrywide regulations as discussed in Part IV. 
Part IV spotlights the Italian and French legal and regulatory regimes. 
Part V compares the legal and regulatory arsenals of the United States, 
Italy, and France to identify which of the three nations has stricter laws 
to help trademark owners and curb the increasing rate of counterfeit 
goods. Part V argues that the legal and regulatory arsenals of the 
United States, Italy, and France provide minimal assistance to stall 
counterfeit production in the PRC and Hong Kong. This Part also 
 
 13. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in The People’s Republic of China, 
78 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 3–7 (2000).  
 14. Id.  
 15. George James, Agents Raid Production Line in Queens for Fake Labels, N.Y. 
TIMES, at B3, (Sept. 28, 1995), https://www.nytimes.com/1995/09/28/nyregion/age 
nts-raid-production-lines-in-queens-for-fake-labels.html [https://perma.cc/D4F5-
KDK7].  
 16. Id.  
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presents potential solutions, requiring international diplomacy, to curb 
the adverse effects of counterfeiting. This Comment concludes with 
an optimistic perspective about the future of anti-counterfeiting.  
II. COUNTERFEITING IN THE PRC & HONG KONG  
The PRC and Hong Kong remain the most extensive, mass 
producers of counterfeit goods because of economic and local 
protectionism, which protects counterfeiters more than trademark 
owners.17 The PRC and Hong Kong transitioned from a centrally 
planned economic system to a more market-based economy known as 
the socialist market economy (“SME”).18 SME is a system grounded 
in the superiority of public ownership and state-owned enterprises 
within a market economy.19 SME enables counterfeiters to thrive 
because the economy relies on the state-owned ownership of 
production and people.20 Although many factors aid the PRC’s and 
Hong Kong’s counterfeiting economic marketplace, the most salient 
factors are local protectionism affecting governance and enforcement, 
free trade zones, and brand owner’s relationship with the PRC and 
Hong Kong. 
A. Local Protectionism Affecting Governance & Enforcement 
Local protectionism of counterfeiting marketplaces affects 
governance, civil, and criminal enforcement in the PRC and Hong 
Kong. Local and national governance issues throughout the PRC and 
Hong Kong fuel the counterfeiting industry’s growth because a 
centralized system does not exist to monitor, regulate, and eradicate 
counterfeit syndicates throughout both areas. Local governments have 
little interest in regulating counterfeiting because it has become 
immensely profitable for the government to collect revenue from 
distribution, manufacturing, shipping, and trademark owners.21 
 
 17. Yeh, supra note 12.  
 18. The World Factbook, CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/geos/ch.html [https://perma.cc/D35C-YH9M]. 
 19. Xiaoqin Ding, The Socialist Market Economy: China and the World, Vol. 
73, No. 2 SCI. & SOC’Y 235, 237–38 (2009) (explaining that the socialist economic 
system at its primary stage is explicitly stipulated in Article 6 of the PRC 
Constitution. The basis of such economy is socialist public ownership of the means 
of production, namely, ownership of the whole people and collective ownership by 
the working people.). 
 20. Id.  
 21. See Joyce Chang, Trademark Counterfeiting In China: The Real Price Of 
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Through the administrative agencies, local governments often collect 
fees from trademark owners to pursue counterfeiters while 
simultaneously raiding counterfeiting syndicates only to charge an 
additional fee for the counterfeits to receive their merchandise.22 
Without counterfeiting and fee collection, many employed citizens 
would struggle to find work, increasing poverty and homelessness in 
the PRC and Hong Kong.23 Local governments seek to benefit from 
the very enterprise they are tasked with regulating, presenting a 
striking conflict of interest that hinders trademark owner’s ability to 
protect their marks in the PRC and Hong Kong.24 The financial 
benefits for local governments outweigh the harm of counterfeiting 
costs; therefore, the Chinese do not have an incentive to restrict 
counterfeiting trade because of the direct, yet varied, revenue each 
province receives.25  
Also, the local government’s control mechanisms make it 
exceptionally difficult for insurgent officials in the government to 
reduce counterfeiting.26 Incumbent government officials who support 
counterfeiting are often involved in the local election systems, which 
works for counterfeiter’s benefit.27 The incumbent officials are 
routinely involved in the nomination and selection process of the 
province’s judges, police officers, and administrative enforcement 
officials.28 The election of administrative enforcement officials 
remains salient because the Administration of Industry and Commerce 
(“AIC”) and the Technical Supervision Bureau (“TSB”) oversee much 
of the trademark counterfeiting enforcement process.29 The AIC’s 
enforcement authority is based on its jurisdiction over all aspects of 
trademarks.30 The TSB has authority over product quality and 
consumer protection issues, including the authority to bring 
enforcement actions against counterfeit products of inferior quality 
 
Knock-Offs, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 765, 781 (2014) (citing Daniel C.K. Chow, 
Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies in China: How a 
Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 756 
(2010)).  
 22. See Chow, supra note 14, at 30–31.  
 23. Daniel C.K. Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National 
Companies in China: How a Flawed Approach is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 749, 755 (2010); see also Ding, supra note 18, at 239–41.  
 24. Id.   
 25. See id.  
 26. Chang, supra note 21, 750-757.  
 27. Chang, supra note 20, at 781. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Chow, supra note 14, at 22. 
 30. Id. 
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and products that defraud or harm consumers.31 If these individuals 
choose to act contrary to the local government’s objectives, they risk 
retaliatory action such as job termination, demotion, or reduced 
income.32 The pressure of enforcement officials relinquishing anti-
counterfeiting measures to local leaders outweighs the enforcement 
official’s motivation to enforce laws against counterfeiters, thereby 
making enforcement unsustainable.33 
Local and national government control makes it difficult for law 
enforcement officials and the judicial system to prosecute 
counterfeiters.34 With the local government selecting administrative 
enforcement officials, such officials rarely transfer counterfeiting 
cases from the respective agency to the judicial system.35 The lack of 
transfer means that the cases do not get prosecuted. The next hurdles 
are collecting evidence and overcoming the Chinese court’s 
evidentiary standards, even if administrative enforcement moves cases 
to the judicial system.36 In the PRC and Hong Kong, it is not easy to 
gather evidence because counterfeiters engage in complex, often 
undocumented trade routes.37 The complexity of trade routes leaves 
little to no physical evidence to present in judicial proceedings.38 
Additionally, trademark owners cannot satisfy the strict evidentiary 
standards because Chinese courts require physical evidence of prior 
sales in the form of account books, sales orders, sales receipts, tax 
receipts, or any other form of direct physical evidence.39 Counterfeit 
goods seized on the premises, counterfeit packaging, or the equipment 
used in the manufacture of counterfeit goods are not considered 
sales.40 The prerequisite of direct physical evidence creates a 
substantial obstacle to establishing criminal liability.41 
B. Free Trade Zones  
In addition to local protectionism, free trade zones (“FTZs”) enable 
counterfeiter’s continued mission of expanding their fake-goods 
 
 31. Id. at 21.   
 32. Chang, supra note 20, at 781. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Chow, supra note 14, at 33. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Chow, supra note 14, at 35. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. at 34. 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. at 34–35. 
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empires while infringing trademarks. FTZs are areas “within which 
goods may be landed, handled, manufactured, or reconfigured and 
reexported without the intervention of the customs authorities.”42 Such 
areas become subject to the prevailing customs duties only when the 
goods are moved to consumers within the country in which the zones 
are located.43 FTZs are systematized based on seaports, international 
airports, and national frontiers, all of which have many geographic 
advantages for trade.44 In their least appealing manifestation, FTZs 
represent no more than ringfenced enclaves that provide multinational 
organizations tax relief while employees, many of whom are women, 
slave in sweatshops and garment factories.45 
There are an estimated 3,500 FTZs in more than 130 economies, 
employing 66 million people and generating more than $500 billion in 
direct-rate-related-value added to the global economy.46 Nevertheless, 
FTZs provide an opening for counterfeiters to transport shipments of 
cargo using the established supply chain lines, which have little to no 
oversight.47 Although FTZs are considered great opportunities for 
business activity advancement and tax incentives, these zones, 
combined with weak governance structures, are a breeding ground for 
counterfeiters to continue shipping goods.48 FTZs have much of what 
a counterfeiter could hope for: a low-cost foothold in a host territory; 
concentrated industrial facilities equipped for transformation, 
relabeling, and repackaging; low labor costs; and a withdrawn 
oversight philosophy with the ability to assimilate with legitimate 
businesses.49 Without stricter customs and border patrol measures to 
inspect FTZs, counterfeiters continue to benefit from the lack of 
enforcement at trademark owners expense.50 
 
 42. Free-trade zone, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Feb. 26, 2016), 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/free-trade-zone [https://perma.cc/ZP39-X3ZL]. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Piotr Stryskowski & Bill Below, Free Trade Zones: A Free Ride for 
Counterfeiters?, OECD ON THE LEVEL (Mar. 23, 2018), 
https://oecdonthelevel.com/2018/03/14/free-trade-zones-a-free-ride-for-
counterfeiters/ [https://perma.cc/V3HF-XV39]. 
 46. OECD/EUIPO, Trade in Counterfeit Goods and Free Trade Zones: Evidence 
from Recent Trends, OECD ILIBRARY 16 (Mar. 15, 2018) https://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264289550-en.pdf?expires=1614899055&id=id&accna 
me=ocid177419&checksum=77045C436C19B801EC051AD642E0EAA9 
[https://perma.cc/94LA-GNZT] (hereinafter “OECD/EUIPO Free Trade Zones”).  
 47. Stryskowski & Below, supra note 41, at 13.  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  
 50. Id.  
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A link exists between the largest FTZ and the countries with the 
largest counterfeit industries.51 In the PRC and Hong Kong, the ties 
between local governance and little FTZ oversight exacerbates the 
growing presence of counterfeit organizations. It is no wonder that the 
PRC and Hong Kong remain breeding grounds for counterfeit 
syndicates when you combine the local governance and enforcement 
issues with low FTZ oversight, lack of available evidence, and 
financial and employment incentives that governments and citizens 
receive. 52 
C. Relationships Between Trademark Owners and the PRC and 
Hong Kong 
Trademark owners have a unique yet dysfunctional relationship 
with the PRC and Hong Kong.53 The PRC and Hong Kong are the 
leading locations for manufacturing and exporting.54 China became a 
member of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”),55 and it has free 
trade agreements with several nations including the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), Australia, New Zealand, 
Pakistan, South Korea, and Switzerland.56 With a labor force of 807.75 
million people57 and being the headquarters to 119 Fortune 500 
companies,58 one would think that China would be more friendly 
towards trademark owners. But the PRC and Hong Kong remain two 
of the largest intellectual property rights infringers because such rights 
do not align with the Chinese values, and the regions have financially 
benefited from counterfeiting so much that reducing counterfeiting 
would cripple provinces.59 Yet trademark owners continue to pour 
 
 51. OECD/EUIPO Free Trade Zones, supra note 42, at 47. 
 52. Id.  
 53. Chow, supra note 14, at 25. 
 54. Chris Devonshire-Ellis, Understanding China’s Free Trade Agreements, 
China Briefing (Feb. 10, 2014), https://www.china-
briefing.com/news/understanding-chinas-free-trade-agreements/ 
[https://perma.cc/CK5F-AUTD].  
 55. China and the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Sept. 26, 2020, 9:32 AM), 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/china_e.htm 
[https://perma.cc/WM46-3RW2]. 
 56. Id.  
 57. Labor Force in China from 2008 to 2018, STATISTA (May 27, 2020), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/282134/china-labor-force/ 
[https://perma.cc/TM5Y-9X3L].  
 58. Global 500 List, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, 
https://fortune.com/global500/2019/search/?hqcountry=China 
[https://perma.cc/8QQ6-S5P3]. 
 59. Chow, supra note 14, at 18. 
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billions of dollars into the PRC and Hong Kong without demanding 
drastic structural changes to support a reduction in counterfeiting.60 
Businesses pour billions of dollars into the PRC and Hong Kong  but 
businesses only use a small percentage of the money in advertising 
and merchandise to combat counterfeiting.61 Trademark owners also 
continue to seek manufacturing and distribution services for their 
goods in the region.62 However, trademark owners do not alienate the 
PRC and Hong Kong because executives fear retaliation by the 
Chinese government, which could damage businesses and national 
economies for decades.63 Nevertheless, foreign trademark owners 
often lobby their governments to impose stricter legal and regulatory 
measures to prevent Chinese counterfeit merchandise from entering 
and flowing throughout their respective countries.  
III. THE UNITED STATES LEGAL & REGULATORY ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING ARSENAL  
According to the Lanham Act,64 a counterfeit is a “spurious mark 
that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from, a 
registered mark.”65 For the Lanham Act to apply, the counterfeit mark 
must be used “in connection with services or goods that are nearly 
identical to the services and goods for which the true trademark or 
service mark was registered.”66 If a third party uses the same 
trademark or service mark on goods and services that are related but 
not identical, then the trademark owner must resort to trademark 
infringement as the cause of action.67 
As a state and federal crime, counterfeiting involves the 
manufacturing or distribution of goods under someone else’s name 
without their permission.68 Counterfeit goods are generally made from 
lower quality components to sell a cheap imitation of similar goods 
produced by brands that consumers know and trust.69 Although 
 
 60. Id. at 47. 
 61. Id. at 47 n.157. 
 62. Id. at 18. 
 63. Id. at 47. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (explaining the definition of a counterfeit). 
 65. Id.  
 66. Trademark Counterfeiting: Everything You Need to Know, UPCOUNSEL, 
https://www.upcounsel.com/trademark-counterfeiting [https://perma.cc/A9HW-
4JSK].  
 67. Id.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Tiffani L. McDonough, Piecing It All Together: The Amendment to the 
Federal Trademark Counterfeiting Act Prevents Circumvention Through 
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trademark counterfeiting is a lucrative crime, companies in the United 
States lose upwards of $600 billion per year.70 This Part covers some 
of the federal statutes used to reduce trademark counterfeiting. 
Subsection A discusses the federal laws that impose civil and criminal 
penalties on counterfeiters. Subsection B analyzes International Trade 
Commission (“ITC”) 19 U.S.C. § 1337, the use of exclusion orders to 
combat counterfeiting, and the United States Customs and Border 
Patrol (“CBP”) enforcement of ITC regulations. Finally, Subsection C 
analyzes the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 
(“RICO”) Act71—the primary criminal law utilized to protect 
trademark owners against counterfeiting syndicates.  
A. The Lanham Act & Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 
In 1946, Congress passed the Lanham Act, which provides 
trademark owners with a plethora of protection against counterfeiting, 
including forfeiture of profits to the rightful trademark owner and 
seizure and destruction of all counterfeit merchandise.72 Also, the Act 
enables trademark owners to receive compensatory damages to 
remedy past trademark counterfeiting.73 
Both the Lanham Act74 and the Trademark Counterfeiting Act 
(“TCA”) of 198475—the two federal statutes that create civil and 
criminal liability for trademark infringement—define the term 
“counterfeit” vaguely and broadly. However, the designation of a 
mark as “counterfeit,” rather than merely infringement, significantly 
increases the civil remedies and criminal penalties available to punish 
the defendant for misusing a trademark in this manner. The Lanham 
Act addresses the establishment of trademark rights as well as civil 
anti-counterfeiting enforcement.76  
 
Component Parts, 35 AIPLA Q.J. 69, 73 (2007). 
 70. Id. at 76. 
 71. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012). 
 72. Lanham Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1129 (2012)). 
 73. See PAUL R. PARADISE, TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING, PRODUCT PIRACY 
AND THE BILLION DOLLAR THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY, at 8, (1999).  
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (2012).  
 75. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (2012) (discussing why Congress criminalized trademark 
counterfeiting, via the TCA, because it found that the “penalties under the Lanham 
Act have been too small, and too infrequently imposed, to deter counterfeiting 
significantly.”). 
 76. Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, Tit. II, § 
1502(a), 98 Stat. 2178 (1984); Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-153, § 3, 110 Stat. 1386 (1996).  
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United States counterfeiting laws are more trademark-owner 
friendly, aiding owners in seeking civil and criminal sanctions against 
counterfeiters. For example, the definition of counterfeit trademark in 
section 45 of the Lanham Act77 requires trademark registration to 
establish a prima facie case for infringement under the law.78 Liability 
for counterfeiting requires a greater degree of copying than mere 
trademark infringement. Counterfeiting requires more than the 
accused trademark to be “identical or indistinguishable” from 
another’s registered trademark. Trademark infringement liability 
requires only: 
 a colorable imitation of a registered mark that is likely “to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”; or 
 in the case of an unregistered mark, the use of a name, 
symbol, term, or device that is “likely to cause confusion, or 
to cause mistake, or to deceive.”79  
The standard for trademark infringement remains easier to overcome 
than that for “counterfeit” marks. According to the United States 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”),80 the government must show the 
following to prove that a trademark was counterfeit:  
 The mark is spurious. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d)(1)(a). A mark is 
“spurious” if it is “not genuine or authentic.”81 
 The mark was used in connection with trafficking in goods 
or services.82 
 The mark is “identical with, or substantially 
indistinguishable from” the genuine trademark.83  
 The genuine mark is registered on the principal register in 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office.84  
 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012). 
 78. Id.  
 79. §§ 1114, 1125(a).  




 81. Id.  
 82. 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(1)(A)(i) (2012). 
 83. See § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii); see also Department of Justice, Criminal Resource 
Manual Section 1715 Trademark Counterfeiting—Requirements for A “Counterfeit 
Mark,” (Sept 27, 2020 6:02 PM) https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-
resource-manual-1715-trademark-counterfeiting-requirements-counterfeit-mark 
[https://perma.cc/D5FW-946X].  
 84. See § 2320(f)(1)(A)(ii); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1057 (explaining that 
this element limits the class of trademarks covered by the statute, and establishing 
the basis for federal jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, since use in commerce 
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 The genuine mark is in use. The genuine mark must not only 
be registered, it must also be in use.85 
 The goods or services are those for which the genuine mark 
is registered.86 
 The use of a counterfeit mark is “likely to cause confusion, 
to cause the mistake, or to deceive.”87 
Building upon the Lanham Act, Congress passed the TCA to 
combat the rise in counterfeiting by criminalizing the intentional 
trafficking of counterfeit goods or services by counterfeiters who 
“knowingly” use a counterfeit mark.88 The knowledge standard 
requires that the counterfeiter “is aware,” “has a firm belief to the 
effect,” or is “willfully blind” to the mark being counterfeit.89 Under 
the TCA, violations of the Lanham Act’s anti-counterfeiting 
provisions are a federal, criminal offense. The government must 
establish that: (1) the defendant trafficked or attempted to traffic in 
goods or services; (2) the trafficking or attempted trafficking was 
intentional; (3) the defendant used a counterfeit mark on or in 
connection with such goods or services; and (4) the defendant knew 
the mark used was counterfeit.90 A defendant can be prosecuted for 
assisting in the trafficking of counterfeit goods regardless of the intent 




is a requirement for registration); § 1057(b) (citing that registration on the principal 
register is prima facie evidence that the mark has been in interstate commerce prior 
to registration); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538 
(2d Cir. 1956). 
 85. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii) (2012). 
 86. Id.  
 87. § 2320(f)(1)(iv). 
 88. See § 2320 (a)(1); see also § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii) (explaining that regardless of 
whether a defendant knows that a mark, to which the counterfeit mark is identical or 
indistinguishable from, is already registered). 
 89. See Lauren D. Amendolara, Note, Knocking Out Knock-Offs: Effectuating 
the Criminalization of Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. 
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 800 (2005).  
 90. See United States v. Yi, 460 F.3d 623, 629 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United 
States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485, 487 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also United States v. Cone, 
714 F.3d 197, 206–207 (4th Cir. 2013) (reviewing the four elements that the 
Government is required to prove to obtain a conviction under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2320; 
however, the term “goods” is not defined in § 2320.). 
 91. See § 2320 (a)(1); see also § 2320 (f)(1)(A)(ii) (explaining that regardless of 
whether a defendant has knowledge that a mark, to which the counterfeit mark is 
identical or indistinguishable from, is already registered). 
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(A) if an individual, shall be fined not more than 
$2,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or 
both, and, if a person other than an individual, shall be 
fined not more than $5,000,000; and (B) for a second 
or subsequent offense under subsection (A), if an 
individual, shall be fined not more than $5,000,000 or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and if other 
than an individual, shall be fined not more than 
$15,000,000.92 
 
Unlike traditional trademark infringement where certain types of 
emergency relief are not available and sanctions are loose, 
counterfeiting is subject to higher civil damages and criminal 
penalties.93 
B. United States International Trade Commission 19 U.S.C. § 1337 
Under section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930,94 the ITC has the 
authorization to exclude articles from entry into the United States that 
have been found to violate United States intellectual property rights or 
where the respondent has committed other unfair acts relating to 
imported products. The United States Customs and Border Protection 
(“CBP”) enforced such exclusion orders through an extensive, detail-
oriented investigation. The trademark owner, accused counterfeiter, 
and an ITC-appointed investigative attorney, who operates as a third 
party charged with protecting the public interest, all participate in 
CBP’s investigative processes.95 CBP has the authority to examine, 
inspect, and search vessels, vehicles, cargo, baggage, and persons 
entering the United States for any breach of the law.96 CBP adopted 
the Lanham Act’s definition of counterfeiting, which enables CBP to 
seize goods suspected of trademark counterfeiting.97 CBP will notify 
the importer within five days that it has detained the suspected 
counterfeit goods; then the importer has seven days to provide 
evidence that the goods are not counterfeit.98 If the importer fails to 
respond, or if the importer cannot provide sufficient proof, CBP may 
 
 92. § 2320(b)(1). 
 93. Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012). 
 94. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2012).  
 95. Id.  
 96. 19 USC §§ 1581, 1582 (2019).  
 97. 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 (2019). 
 98. § 133.21(a)(2). 
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notify the trademark owner of the detainment and invite the owner to 
assist in the examination of the counterfeit goods. This notification 
may include: (1) the date of import; (2) the port of entry; (3) the 
country of origin; (4) the identity of the importer and manufacturer; 
and (5) samples of the goods for authentication.99 
If CBP determines that the goods bear a counterfeit mark after 
examination, it will seize the goods, and they will be forfeited. To 
utilize CBP’s detainment and seizure powers, a trademark owner must 
record its trademark registration with the agency; recording may be 
done online and costs $190 per class of goods.100 Trademark owners 
are strongly encouraged to provide additional information that would 
help identify counterfeit goods. Examples of additional information 
include physical hallmarks of the goods, geographic origins of 
authentic goods, the names of authorized manufacturers or licensees, 
and the names of past infringers.101 At the end of the investigation, the 
ITC holds an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the importer 
possessed counterfeit goods.102 ITC proceeds are like United States 
federal court trials except that the process occurs on an expedited basis 
with the ITC determining if the import violates section 337.103 If an 
infringer violated section 337, then the ITC may issue an exclusion 
order barring counterfeit product from entry into the United States.104 
C. Criminal Laws Restricting Trademark Counterfeiting  
Another mechanism for combating counterfeiting involves criminal 
laws and high penalties to deter trademark counterfeiting. Congress 
made use of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 to quietly ensure that counterfeiting trademarked goods 
remained a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2320.105 Section 2320 contains a 
 
 99. § 133.21(a)(4). 
 100. B. Brett Heavner & Yinfei Wu, Procedures and strategies for anti-
counterfeiting: U.S., WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (May 24, 2018), 
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/procedures-and-
strategies-anti-counterfeiting-united-states-0 [https://perma.cc/9DHN-S3ZZ]. 
 101. Id.  
 102. Id. 
 103. Mfg. Indus. Advisor, The Increasingly Popular Section 337, FOLEY & 
LADNER LLP (June 21, 2017), https://www.foley.com/the-increasingly-popular-
section-337-06-21-2017/ [https://perma.cc/N8VL-B7YP].   
 104. Id.; see also Lisa Lyne Cunningham, Trademark Counterfeiting and 
Individual Purchaser Liability, NAT’L L. REV., (Nov. 11, 2011), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/trademark-counterfeiting-and-individual-
purchaser-liability [https://perma.cc/J722-7X8N]. 
 105. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
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long list of specified, unlawful activities that could trigger prosecution 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957—the statutory provisions of the 
Money Laundering Act.106 Additionally, Congress enacted the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Consumer Protection Act of 1996 (“ACPA”) to 
further increase the civil and criminal penalties for trafficking 
counterfeit goods.107 The ACPA also varies the statutory provisions 
that federal prosecutors and law enforcement authorities utilize to 
combat individuals and operations involved in this illegal activity.108  
Federal law also categorizes individuals and operations engaged in 
the trafficking of counterfeit goods as racketeers. Congress created the 
RICO Act to “eliminate organized crime infiltration and racketeering 
into legitimate organizations operating in interstate commerce.”109 
Under the RICO Act, rather than prosecute each crime affecting 
legitimate businesses, prosecutors may indict individuals or 
operations based on a pattern of criminal activity.110 The DOJ and 
Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) enforce the RICO Act 
through robust investigations and prosecutions. The DOJ Criminal 
Manual sections 9.110.010 to 9.110.901 outline the RICO prosecution 
process, indictment requirements, and specific RICO activity 
prosecution review requirements.  
IV. BACKGROUND ON THE EUROPEAN UNION’S RESPONSE TO THE 
GROWING COUNTERFEITING PROBLEM 
The United States and the EU continue to adopt stricter mechanisms 
to combat the proliferation of counterfeit goods. As Asian countries 
continue to manufacture and distribute a vast majority of the 
counterfeit goods, the European Union member states like Italy and 
France impose stricter regulations on counterfeiters and consumers. 
 
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 
U.S.C., 27 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).  
 106. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act § 1956(c)(7)(D) 
(2012).  
 107. See Anticounterfeiting Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-153, 110 
Stat. 1386 (1996). 
 108. Sam Cocks, Comment, The Hoods Who Move the Goods: An Examination 
of the Booming International Trade in Counterfeit Luxury Goods and an Assessment 
of the American Efforts to Curtail Its Proliferation, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J.  501, 525–29 (2007).  
 109. S. REP. NO. 617, at 2 (1969). 
 110. Michael Coblenz, Intellectual Property Crimes, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
235, 240 (1999) (discussing the legislative history behind the Anticounterfeiting 
Consumer Protection Act of 1996); see Lauren D. Amendolara, 15 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 789, 795–99 (2005).  
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The European Union Trademark Regulation (2015/2424/EU) 
(“New Regulation”), amending the Community Trademark 
Regulation (“Old Regulation”), became effective on March 23, 
2016.111 Under the New Regulation, trademark owners can oppose the 
transit of goods bearing unauthorized EU trademarks or marks that are 
substantially similar. The opposition can occur even if the goods are 
not released for free circulation or intended to be sold within the 
European marketplace.112 Trademark owners may further contest 
other circumstances such as warehousing, FTZs, temporary storage, 
inward processing, or provisional admissions.113 Customs authorities 
are entitled to take actions outlined in Regulation No. 608/2013 on the 
customs enforcement of IP rights, such as detaining shipments 
suspected to infringe an EU trademark.114 The owner’s rights to an EU 
or nationally registered trademark could lapse if, during the 
proceedings initiated to determine whether the registered trademark 
has been infringed, the declarant or the holder of the goods provides 
evidence that the registered trademark owner should not be entitled to 
prohibit the declarant from placing the goods on the market in the 
country of final destination.115 
Aside from the EU’s Trademark Regulation, some experts 
considered EU Customs Regulation 608/2013 the most robust and 
cost-efficient mechanism for combating trademark counterfeiting. 
This regulation, which took effect on January 24, 2014, repealed the 
long-standing EU Regulation 1383/2003.116 Regulation 608/2013 
extends the existing system to rights in trade names and removes the 
requirement to commence intellectual property infringement 
proceedings before suspected counterfeit goods can be destroyed, 
 
 111. Trademark Regulation 2015/2424 art. 4, 2015 O.J. (L 341) 88 (EN). 
 112. Id. at 23. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Intellectual Property Rights - Facts and figures, EUR. UNION (Sept. 19, 
2019), https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/customs-controls/counterfeit 
-piracy-other-ipr-violations/ipr-infringements-facts-figures_en [https://perma.cc/M 
5RT-MYF8]; Ana Bruder & Konstantin von Werder, The Transit of Goods Under 
the New EU Trademark Regulation, ALL ABOUT IP BLOG (May 13, 2016), 
https://www.allaboutipblog.com/2016/05/the-transit-of-goods-under-the-new-eu-
trademark-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/SFF7-8NXT].  
 115. EUTM Seniority, MEWBURN ELLIS, https://www.mewburn.com/law-
practice-library/eutm-seniority [https://perma.cc/GH93-CN5S]. 
 116. Paola Andreottola, European Union: Trademark owners versus 
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provided that the declarant or holder of the goods agrees to the 
destruction.117 The regulation also introduces procedures enabling 
small consignments of counterfeit goods to be destroyed without the 
explicit agreement of the rights holder, provided that she makes a 
general destruction request.118 The regulation also provides 
exemptions for travelers’ luggage but only if the goods are 
non-commercial and contained in travelers’ luggage.119 This 
exemption serves the unhindered passenger traffic but poses an 
excellent source for the influx of counterfeit goods into the EU.120 
In 2016, Europol and EUIPO joined forces to create the Intellectual 
Property Crime Coordinated Coalition (“IPC3”), which operates 
within Europol. IPC3 strengthens the fight against counterfeiting and 
piracy online and offline. IPC3 provides operational and technical 
support to law enforcement agencies and other partners in the EU and 
beyond by facilitating and coordinating cross-border investigations; 
monitoring and reporting online crime trends and emerging modi 
operandi; raising public awareness of this crime; and providing 
training to law enforcement in how to combat it.121 The IPC3 produced 
significant results. At the end of its first year of operation, it supported 
more than fifty high-priority cases of intellectual property 
infringement.122 As the EU expands protections for member states, 
some members implemented stricter laws to curb counterfeiting and 
reduce the amount of revenue lost each year.  
V. ANTI-COUNTERFEITING MEASURES OF ITALY & FRANCE 
According to the IACC, the counterfeit goods industry has a global 
value of more than $1.7 trillion, making it many times more profitable 
than the global drug trade.123 In a report commissioned by the 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; see also Edward Carrington et al., Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
Toolkit for Italy, U.S. Com. Serv. (Sep. 2007), 
https://www.stopfakes.gov/servlet/servlet.FileDownload?file=015t00000004q8B 
[https://perma.cc/LQ7C-FCW5].  
 119. Regulation 608/2013 art. 1, 2013 O.J. (L. 181) 19 (EN). 
 120. See Sandra Rinnert, New European Regulation 608/2013 concerning 
combating counterfeit goods, 9 WORLD CUSTOMS J.  37, 38 (2013). 
 121. Intellectual Property Crime Coordinated Coalition-IPC3, EUROPOL, 
https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/intellectual-property-crime-
coordinated-coalition-ipc3 [https://perma.cc/SQ4M-BD89]. 
 122. Id.  
 123. Matthew Abbey, Counterfeiters Will Win the Trade War, FOREIGN POL’Y 
(Aug. 10, 2018, 9:02 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/10/counterfeiters-
will-win-the-trade-war/ [https://perma.cc/85SR-QSTV].  
  
558 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 7 
 
International Trademark Association and the International Chamber 
of Commerce, Frontier Economics, a consultancy based in Europe, 
predicted that the global counterfeit industry will have a value of $2.3 
trillion by 2022.124 Counterfeit products using marks from the United 
States, Italy, France, and Switzerland comprise more than 50% of all 
counterfeit goods.  
As a result, France and Italy have implemented strict criminal and 
civil penalties for counterfeiters and purchasers, which could lead to a 
drastic reduction in counterfeiting. Italian and French legislators are 
making fruitful attempts to combat the loss of revenue and jobs their 
countries experience because of counterfeiting.  
A. Italy’s Anti-Counterfeiting Regime 
Italian legislators continue to implement laws and regulations 
combating counterfeiting. The prevalence of street vendors in Italy 
and the high influx of imported counterfeit goods continue to be the 
country’s most visible trademark violations.125 Aside from several 
treatises that Italy remains a party to, the Code of Industrial Property 
(“CIP”) and EU regulations govern much of Italy’s intellectual 
property law including trademark registrations and infringements.126 
The IPC3 took effect in 2005 via the Decree-Law 30/2005, but 
legislators subsequently reformed the IPC3 by Legislative Decree 
131/2010.  
The Italian Patent and Trademark Office maintains a first-to-file 
system in which unregistered marks enjoy less protection than 
registered trademarks.127 To enforce claims for both the registered and 
unregistered marks, Italy has twenty-one specific sections of civil 
courts with one court for each Italian region.128 Where a case includes 
a foreign enterprise, only eleven of the venues remain available based 
on rules simplifying the courts. 129 
 
 124. Id.  
 125. See Amanda Silverman, Note, Draconian or Just? Adopting the Italian 
Model of Imposing Administrative Fines on the Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods, 
17 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175, 188 (2009). 
 126. Id.  
 127. See Fabio Angelini & Simone Verducci-Galletti, Trademark Procedures and 
Strategies: Italy, WORLD TRADEMARK REV. (Sept.12, 2018), 
https://www.worldtrademarkreview.com/anti-counterfeiting/trademark-procedures-
and-strategies-italy [https://perma.cc/964L-KUHK].  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id.  
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Unlike the United States, Italy continues to have some of the most 
stringent anti-counterfeiting laws that extend liability to consumers 
purchasing counterfeit goods.130 The Italian Penal Code addresses the 
issue of liability for engaging in the purchase or sale of counterfeit 
items. Article 473 of the Italian Penal Code punishes those who 
counterfeit or alter domestic or foreign brands or distinctive marks of 
intellectual property or utilize counterfeit or altered brands.131 Also, 
the prosecution need only prove that the counterfeiter knew about the 
existence of the trademark; then the defense must provide evidence of 
excusable ignorance. In contrast to the TCA and ACPA, which each 
require some element of specific knowledge that trademark used was 
counterfeit,132 article 473 does not impose such a requirement.133 
Instead, article 473 appears to impose a less restrictive prosecutorial 
standard.  
In addition to article 473, article 474 of the Italian Penal Code 
imposes penalties for introducing counterfeit goods into the Italian 
marketplace.134 The penalties include imprisonment for one to four 
years, fines ranging from €3,500 to €35,000 ($4,850 to $48,500), or 
both.135 Article 474 provides stricter penalties and separate 
punishments for the introduction of counterfeit goods into Italy 
compared to holding the goods for sale and circulation.136 Article 474 
also imposes liability on businesses that import products from foreign 
countries where the production of counterfeit goods is not strictly 
regulated.137 Law 231/2001 illustrates that if an employee purchased 
counterfeit goods from abroad without the company’s knowledge, the 
company could be liable.138 
 
 130. Decreto Legge 14 maggio 2005, n. 80/05, art. 1(7), in G.U. May 14, 2005, n. 
111 (It.), available at http://www.camera.it/parlam/leggi/05080l.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C2CN-63PY].  
 131. Davide Bresner, New counterfeiting regulations in Italy, THOMSON 
REUTERS: PRAC. LAW, 9 (2009), 
https://www.rapisardi.com/rws/home.nsf/0/3A65B311DCF9B7C2C1258451004D
6B92/$FILE/New%20Counterfeiting%20regulations%20in%20Italy%20-
%20DB.002.002.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4KG-H3M3].  
 132. 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (a)(1) (2019); see also Anticounterfeiting Consumer 
Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-153, sec.7, § 1117, 110 Stat. 1386, 1388 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(c) (2019)). 
 133. Bresner, supra note 122, at 9.   
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 10.   
 138. Id.  
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Under Law 99/2009, an update to the Italian Penal Code, 
prosecutors can use a party’s subjective knowledge of a trademark or 
other intellectual property right as an objective element of the 
counterfeiting crime.139 The update also imposes a more realistic 
penalty against consumers who purchase counterfeit merchandise. The 
administrative fines range from €100 to €7,000 ($140 to $9,700). The 
consumer penalties are not as drastic as the penalties for violations that 
involve trafficking counterfeit goods.140  
 
Nevertheless, the legislature has eliminated the 
requirement that a guilty party must have purchased 
counterfeit goods without having first ascertained its 
legitimate origin from the definition of the crime. 
Instead, liability is based on the goods’ appearance of 
illegality, who is selling it, its price, and its quality.141 
 
In addition to the Italian Penal Code, Italy recently implemented a 
new EU trademark directive, strengthening trademark protections to 
combat counterfeiting. Legislative Decree 15/2019 implemented the 
Trademarks Directive, which became effective on March 23, 2019.142 
The reinforcement of trademark protection extends to transported 
goods using cross-border measures thereby countering individual 
preparatory acts of counterfeiting.143 The regulation allows for the 
seizure of counterfeit goods in mere transit within EU member 
states.144 
Over the last three decades, Italy has drastically reformed the 
customs system to curb the increasing influx of counterfeit goods 
flowing internationally. One mechanism customs utilizes to combat 
the threat is the multimedia database, the Fully Automated Logical 
System Against Forgery and Fraud (“FALSTAFF”).145 This database 
 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at 12.  
 142. Giulia Beneduci, Fresh amendments to the Italian Industrial Property Code. 
“Trademarks Package” and “Unitary Patent Package” implemented, LEXOLOGY 
(Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63d2359e-9294-
4bfd-b2fd-5d6e58d1adad. [https://perma.cc/L7EP-VCUV].  
 143. Id.  
 144. Id.  
 145. Giulia Beneduci, Fresh amendments to the Italian Industrial Property Code. 
“Trademarks Package” and “Unitary Patent Package” implemented, LEXOLOGY 
(Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=63d2359e-9294-
4bfd-b2fd-5d6e58d1adad. [https://perma.cc/L7EP-VCUV].  
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is updated directly by rights holders that request protection for their 
goods. Consumers and customs also frequently update the database. 
Customs utilizes the database to gather together information on how 
to distinguish counterfeit goods at the borders.146 The database appears 
to be an effective mechanism, helping customs enforcement make 
more transparent determinations and reducing the need for lengthy 
investigations.147 
The tax police’s Anti-Counterfeiting System (“SIAC”) uses a 
similar and more recent tool, which was co-funded by the European 
Commission.148 The Ministry of Internal Affairs described SIAC as 
“stemm[ing] from the awareness to face a multi-dimensional and 
transversal, illegal phenomenon such as counterfeiting, all 
institutional bodies, and players involved in combating the 
‘counterfeit industry’ should join forces.”149 Little data is available on 
the effectiveness of such databases to combat the influx of counterfeit 
goods through various borders. Italy continues to roll out the red carpet 
to protect domestic and international trademark owners against 
counterfeiting while attempting to curb the financial and employment 
losses caused by counterfeiting.  
B. France’s Anti-Counterfeiting Model  
Like Italy, France continues to implement an extensive legal and 
regulatory structure to reduce the effects of counterfeiting goods 
flowing through the country’s borders. In France, luxury brands 
remain prominent, representing over one quarter of the global, luxury 
industry.150 France’s luxury brand industry is nearly three times the 
size of the United States luxury brand sector.151 In 1995, French 
officials and private agencies created Le Comite National 
Anti-Contrefacon (The National Anti-Counterfeiting Committee 
(“CNAC”)). The CNAC, along with the Comite Colbert, focuses on 
informing consumers about the dangers of counterfeit goods as well 
as the possible penalties individuals would face if they purchase or 
 
 146. Id.  
 147. See id. 
 148. Id.   
 149. Id.   
 150. Global Powers of Luxury Goods 2019: Bridging the gap between the old and 
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possess any counterfeit goods.152 The Comite Colbert, an organization 
comprised of key members of the French luxury industry, notes that 
the luxury goods business remains a strategic imperative to France 
because of the considerable size, presence, and influence of luxury 
designers in the country.153  
The French Intellectual Property Code defines counterfeit broadly 
and identifies all counterfeiting as an offense.154 Like the United 
States, France shares concerns about the considerable consequences 
and costs associated with counterfeiting. Counterfeiting financially 
impacts industries like the fashion, jewelry, pharmaceutical, and food 
industries. Notably, the French Intellectual Property Code imposes 
sanctions and liability on those purchasing or even possessing 
counterfeit items.155 Consumers of counterfeit goods may face a fine 
of up to €300,000 (roughly $373,140) or three years imprisonment.156 
French Customs has broad investigative and anti-counterfeiting 
powers including the right to seize counterfeit products. Officials can 
seize counterfeit goods at ports of entry and in the French 
marketplaces.157 Anyone transporting products into or through France 
must, therefore, possess documentation evidencing the true origin of 
such products including, but not limited to, an agreement or an 
invoice.158 Also, for the first time, tourists entering France could have 
their counterfeit goods seized by customs despite the goods being 
purchased outside of the country.159 Customs, the CNAC, and the 
Comite Colbert continue to spread awareness about the new 
regulations to all entering or living within France and the EU.  
 
 152. Sur Internet, unFfaux Produit Est-il Une Vraie Affiare, CNAC (last visited 
Sept. 26, 2020), http://www.cnac-
contrefacon.fr/publication/content/ART17245.php?archive=0&StartRow=0&order
=1 [https://perma.cc/GD9K-Z6TV]. 
 153. Securing the Leadership of the European High-End and Luxury Industry in 
the Digital Era, EU. CULTURAL & CREATIVE INDUS. ALL. (Oct. 22, 2017), 
http://www.comitecolbert.com/assets/files/paragraphes/fichiers/20/eccia_manifesto
_bd.pdf [https://perma.cc/7T2Z-A6KU]. 
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CODE] art. 112-2, 123-1, 335-2 (Fr.). 
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VI. THE UNITED STATES V. ITALY & FRANCE  
The United States’s attempts to fight counterfeiting markets by 
targeting the supply side have remained feeble. To obtain meaningful 
change and successfully limit the prevalence of trademark 
counterfeiting, the United States should follow the Italian and French 
models and adopt end-consumer penalties such as fines, confiscation, 
or incarceration for situations in which the purchaser knew or should 
have known that the item was a counterfeit.160 These aggressive 
penalties must be accompanied by equally aggressive marketing and 
awareness campaigns to inform consumers about the effects of 
counterfeiting and the potential penalties for continuing to purchase 
such goods.161 However, there are several downsides to implementing 
end-consumer penalties. End-consumer penalties may criminalize 
innocent purchasers who either did not know they were purchasing 
counterfeit goods or knowingly purchased counterfeits to save money. 
Additionally, end-consumer penalties are less favorable because the 
United States has one of the world’s highest mass incarceration 
rates.162 Incarcerating people for purchasing counterfeit goods goes 
against the recent wave of reducing incarceration for non-violent 
crimes. Lastly, end-consumer penalties do not address the influx of 
counterfeit good production, particularly in the PRC, Hong Kong and 
other southeast Asian countries. If the United States wishes to combat 
the drastic proliferation of counterfeit goods produced in the PRC and 
Hong Kong, then the United States government must implement 
systems focused on helping businesses return some manufacturing and 
distribution to the country, empowering unions and low-wage factory 
workers, and protecting intellectual property rights. As a member of 
several multinational treaties, the United States should consider a 
more comprehensive approach that focuses on consumer awareness, 
advocacy for trademark registration in Asian countries, increased 
criminalization of counterfeit production and trafficking, and 
improved customs’ seizures.  
 
 160. Kristoff Grospe, Proposed Law Targets Purchasers of Counterfeit Goods, 
18 CITY L. 1 (Jan./Feb. 2012) (noting how bill sponsor, City Councilmember 
Margaret Chin indicated that “substantial fines are something people understand” 
and how the proposed law will “ultimately … cut down on the demand for these 
illegal goods”). 
 161. Martinez, supra note 147, at 537–38.  
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VII. COMMENTARY ON PROPOSED ANTI-COUNTERFEITING 
LEGISLATION 
The legal and regulatory arsenals adopted by the United States, 
European Union, Italy, and France do not address some of the societal 
and economic issues mentioned in Part I regarding the PRC and Hong 
Kong’s continued proliferation of counterfeit goods. The legal and 
regulatory mechanisms can be likened to a band-aid on a bullet wound 
because it only addresses counterfeit goods entering the respective 
countries. These mechanisms do nothing to aid trademark owners in 
demanding or assisting the Chinese government.  
Fully combatting counterfeiting while improving and not 
destroying international relations requires the aforementioned 
comprehensive approach that focuses on consumer awareness, 
advocacy for trademark registration in Asian countries, increased 
criminalization of counterfeit production and trafficking, and 
improved FTZ oversight and enforcement measures. Countries are 
trying their best to improve the knowledge gap and work with the PRC 
and Hong Kong (China) to combat counterfeiting. Countries must 
cooperate to find reasonable solutions to the growing counterfeiting 
problem that affects more than trademark owners; counterfeiting 
affects everyone working in factories, storefronts, government, 
administrative enforcement, and judicial systems alike.  
A. Multi-National Intellectual Property Education Partnerships 
One mechanism for combating counterfeiting is education. 
Education remains essential because counterfeiting syndicates in the 
PRC and Hong Kong lack the necessary knowledge of and respect for 
intellectual property rights.163 Local protectionism has risen to the 
forefront with the economic and societal benefits of counterfeiting 
outweighing the social and economic harm caused to businesses 
globally.164 While jobs increase in the PRC and Hong Kong, 
trademark owners must respond to the increased counterfeiting by 
cutting jobs in other countries to save the money needed to combat 
counterfeiting. Educating Asian countries on the importance of 
intellectual property rights can provide an opening for brand owners 
and foreign governments to combat counterfeiting at its roots. 
Education can also provide an opportunity for counterfeiting 
syndicates to become legitimate manufacturers and distributors for 
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trademark owners in the Far East.165 This transition would not stop the 
PRC and Hong Kong from obtaining financial benefits and employing 
millions.166 Instead, the transition would open the door for more 
cooperative and legal relationships between China, trademark owners, 
and the Chinese society.  
B. Reconsideration & Implementation of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement  
The world needs a treaty like the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (“ACTA”) now, more than ever before, to battle the highly 
complex counterfeiting networks straddling multiple countries.167 
Proposed in June 2008, the ACTA would have been one of the first 
international agreements explicitly designed to combat counterfeiting 
in a harmonized and coordinated way.168 Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, and the United 
States signed the ACTA in October 2011.169 By 2012, Mexico, the EU, 
and twenty-two EU member states signed the ACTA.170 Japan ratified 
and formally approved the agreement. The ACTA provided a 
multistep formula for combating counterfeiting through civil and 
criminal enforcement, border measures, criminal offenses, penalties, 
enforcement in e-commerce, and international cooperation.171 
According to INTA, ACTA provisions should call for higher standards 
and stronger cooperation on combating counterfeiting; stronger border 
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enforcement, especially with relation to goods in transit; more 
effective criminal penalties; stronger international cooperation 
between enforcement bodies of the signatory countries; and increased 
cooperation between government and industry.172  
Although some countries, including all EU countries, later rejected 
ACTA,173 the agreement provided a baseline for global, trademark 
protection against counterfeiting. Countries should reconsider the 
ACTA, with minor changes, to protect consumers and trademark 
owners who lose more than revenue. The agreement requires 
implementation by most industrialized nations, including the PRC and 
Hong Kong (China), to effectively combat counterfeiting.  
VIII. CONCLUSION 
As globalization continues to flourish, the PRC and Hong Kong 
remain the largest producers of counterfeit goods in the world because 
such countries have no financial or social incentive to stop 
counterfeiting. Mechanisms adopted by the United States, Italy, and 
France are similar yet vastly different in their effect on curbing 
counterfeiting. The United States model focuses on robust trademark 
protections, narrow customs regulations, and criminal laws to reduce 
trademark counterfeiting. Italy and France utilize detailed and robust 
regulations and view criminal laws as a strong mechanism to 
challenging the counterfeiting threat. 
Until the world works with the PRC and Hong Kong to reform their 
economic structure to rely less on counterfeiting and more on 
legitimate businesses, the mechanism adopted by other countries will 
continue to provide minimal relief to trademark owners. International 
treaties, diplomacy, education, and FTZ enforcement are needed now 
more than ever to improve intellectual property protection. It is 
optimistic to think that the world will one day come together to resolve 
this problem so that businesses feel protected as they expand globally, 
but this optimistic yet compassionate view is necessary to combat one 
of the fastest-growing global issues.  
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